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L Introduction
On May 19, 1998, after a heated argument with his superior, Edward
Williams was suspended from the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police
Department (PHA). Williams, a PHA police officer for 24 years, called a
counselor later that night. During the conversation he remarked, "I understand
why people go postal."1 According to later accounts by the counselor, Williams
spoke of"smoking people, going postal, and having the means to do it."
2
Williams did not return to work and began to call in sick.3 After an
evaluation, a local counselor concluded that he suffered from major
depression.4 PHA's staff psychologist evaluated Williams and recommended
that he be temporarily reassigned to a position that did not require him to carry
a weapon but added that Williams could "work around other officers who will
be wearing their weapon. '" 5  PHA misconstrued the psychologist's
recommendations and believed that Williams was unable to work around armed
officers.6 On October 14, Williams requested assignment to the PHA radio
room. 7 PHA, incorrectly believing that he was not qualified for any position as




5. Id. at 757.
6. See id. (stating the defendant's argument that Williams could not work around
weapons or have access to weapons and thus was not qualified to work in the radio room).
7. Id.
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a result of the psychologist's recommendations, did not assign him the job.8 On
December 3, a human resources manager at PHA asked Williams to file for
medical leave. 9 Williams did not respond.10 On December 29, PHA sent
Williams a termination letter."
Williams filed suit against his former employer in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In Williams v.
Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department,12 Williams argued that
PHA violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) by
discriminating against him.13  Williams alleged, in part, that he had a
"disability" under the ADA because PHA believed that he was disabled. 14 Due
to this disability, Williams argued, PHA was required to reasonably
accommodate him so that he could continue working. 5 When he requested
accommodation by a transfer to a radio room position, PHA failed to respond
and subsequently terminated him. 16 Williams alleged that PHA discriminated
against him by failing to provide the required accommodations.' 7 In essence,
Williams argued that PHA's misperception had unlawfully barred him from
working.
The ADA prohibits discrimination by employers against employees with
disabilities.' 8 The definition of "disability" does not distinguish between
having "a physical or mental impairment" and "being regarded as having such
an impairment."' 9 This strong protection for nonexistent disabilities was
8. See id. (stating the defendant's argument that Williams could not work around
weapons or have access to weapons and thus was not qualified to work in the radio room).
9. Id. at 758.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 230 F. Supp. 2d 631 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
rev'd, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004). For a further discussion of Williams and the appellate
decision, see Part III.F of this Note.
13. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 2004).
14. See id. at 766 (noting Williams's argument that PHA wrongly perceived him as
having limitations he did not have, and thereby regarded him as being disabled).
15. See id. at 761-62 (stating that Williams alleges he was discriminated against by
PHA's failure to provide the reasonable accommodations he requested).
16. Id. at 757-58.
17. See id. at 768 ("It is Williams's position that with the benefit of an accommodation
transfer he would have been able to perform the essential functions of a member of the radio
room.").
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2000) (defining "disability"); id. § 12112(a)
(stating that no employer may discriminate against a qualified individual).
19. See id. § 12102(2) (defining "disability" as both "a physical or mental impairment"
and "being regarded as having such an impairment").
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intentional, as the Act's legislative history shows: Congress adopted the view
that "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment.
20
Under the ADA, failing to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee
is an act of discrimination. 2' Reasonable accommodations, according to the
EEOC, could include such changes as job restructuring or reassignment to a
vacant position.22 Combining the "disability" and "discrimination" definitions
suggests that employees are entitled to reasonable accommodations to the
extent that they are perceived as disabled.23 In Williams's case, he was barred
from working because of PHA's misperception of his impairment and its
refusal to accommodate him.24  PHA's actions thus appear to qualify as
discrimination under the ADA.25 The Third Circuit, in reviewing Williams's
case, agreed.26
This notion of accommodating a perceived disability, rather than an actual
disability, has become a controversial concept, but it is one that only a few
cases have tackled.27 The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held
that the ADA does not afford these Williams-like requirements.28 The Eighth
Circuit argued that such requirements would create a disparity in treatment
among impaired but nondisabled employees. 29 The ADA, concluded the court,
20. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 30 (1990), reprinted at 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,453
(quoting Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)); see also Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth.
Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing the Arline decision and finding that
the decision supports the proposition that "regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable
accommodations).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (describing the provision for reasonable
accommodations).
22. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (2004).
23. For a discussion of interpretation of the Act's plain language, see infra Part IV.A.
24. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775-76 (concluding that Williams was unable to work
because of his employer's misperception).
25. For a discussion of interpretation of the Act's plain language, see infra Part IV.A. For
a discussion of the Williams arguments, see generally Part IV.
26. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751,775-76 (3d Cir. 2004)
(concluding that Williams was unable to work because of his employer's misperception).
27. See Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The Employer's Duty to
Accommodate Perceived Disabilities, 30 AIZ. STATE L.J. 603, 610 (1998) (remarking that
"[e]xisting legal authority addressing perceived disability issues is relatively meager").
28. For a discussion of the key circuit court cases that have held that the ADA does not
afford Williams-like requirements, see infra Part 1II.
29. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 917 (8th Cir. 2003) (arguing that that
disparity in treatment among similarly situated employees would be a bizarre result and that
Congress could not have intended such an outcome).
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could not reasonably have been intended to create such a result.3° The Ninth
Circuit later expanded on this rationale, writing that such a result would "do
nothing to encourage" the removal of stereotypic assumptions in the
workplace.31
Prior to Williams, only the First Circuit determined that Williams-like
accommodations should be available to employees, but did so with no
analysis.32 The Third Circuit itself had previously expressed doubts that
Congress intended for the ADA to provide such accommodations.33 This
suggests that the Third Circuit's decision in Williams could be an anomaly.
However, as this Note will argue, the Williams decision is not an anomaly
but instead is the appropriate interpretation of the Act. It will also argue,
however, that Williams-like requirements leave open the possibility that
employees would abuse the requirements to gain unwarranted accommodations.
A less severe, but equally troubling, result would be that employees are simply
not encouraged to correct discriminatory "myths and fears."
34
This Note endorses two protections that would prevent the "gaming"
problem, provide a clear rule for employers to depend on, and produce a
broader enforcement of the purposes of the Act. These doctrines, the
"interactive process" requirement and the limited Third Circuit defense
introduced in Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc.,35 mesh with the Williams
holding to provide a robust framework for both courts and employers.
30. See id. (arguing that Congress could not have intended such an outcome).
31. See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003) (arguing
that requiring reasonable accommodations for regarded-as employees would do nothing to
encourage employers to see their employees' talents clearly).
32. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citing Katz v. City Metal Co. but pointing to district court decisions as "better reasoned"). For
a discussion of Katz, see infra Part III.D.
33. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating,
without deciding, that "it seems odd" to give an impaired but not disabled person a windfall
because of an employer's misperception) (citing Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148
n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
34. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 30 (1989), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445 (quoting Sch.
Bd. v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)). See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of policy
rationales for relevant portions of the ADA.
35. Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999). In Pathmark, the
plaintiff was a grocery store manager who injured his ankle several times. Id. at 183. As a
result, he was put on light duty work at the store. Id. After a doctor's evaluation, Pathmark
concluded that the plaintiff was unable to stand for long periods, and terminated him. Id. at
184. Later, Pathmark admitted that it had received incorrect information, but declined to
reinstate the plaintiff. Id. at 184-85. Taylor filed suit under the ADA, arguing that Pathmark
could have provided him with a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed him to
work. Id. at 185. Taylor also argued that he was regarded as disabled, based on a mistaken
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In Part II, this Note will discuss the relevant terms and tests involved in an
ADA reasonable accommodations claim. Part III will examine the major
decisions that have shaped the current circuit split. Part IV will discuss the
arguments given by both sides of the split. It will examine those arguments in
the context of the origins of the reasonable accommodation and "regarded as"
provisions of the ADA. It will argue that the Third Circuit's reading of the
ADA is the better reading of the provision but that this reading leaves room for
abuse and strange theoretical results. In Part V, this Note will suggest a
possible resolution by arguing that courts should look primarily at the existence
of an "interactive process" at the earliest and latest stages of a claim. It will
also discuss the limited defense developed by the Third Circuit to combat ADA
abuse. Finally, this Note will offer some concluding remarks in Part VI, by
discussing the value of the proposed rules in the scheme of the ADA's larger
purposes.
I. An Overview of a Reasonable Accommodations Claim
This Part presents an overview of the relevant law involved in an ADA
accommodations claim. Because ADA claims can be quite complex, this
discussion cannot cover every permutation or detail,36 but it will provide the
essential elements for a prima facie case based on reasonable accommodations
for a regarded-as disability. This Part will provide the necessary background
for understanding Williams and the other circuit decisions forming the split. In
particular, it is important to understand the interplay between the "reasonable
accommodation" provision and the "disability" definition.
A. "Disability" under the ADA
The statutory rule providing the basis for the Act's antidiscrimination
provisions states that no employer covered under the Act may "discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability .... 37
interpretation of medical records. Id. at 188. The district court concluded that the plaintiff was
not regarded as disabled. Id. at 182. The Third Circuit reversed, stating that an employer's
innocent mistake may still subject it to liability under the ADA. Id. The court recognized a
limited defense of reasonable mistake where the employee is responsible for the employer's
misperception. Id. at 182-83.
36. Courts have acknowledged the complexity of the ADA. See Taylor, 177 F.3d at 183
(noting the complexity of the ADA and related claims).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
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A "disability" is defined as either "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more.., major life activities," a "record of such an
impairment," or "being regarded as having such an impairment. 38 The EEOC
has expanded on the third prong by stating that a person is regarded as having
an impairment if he or she,
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit
major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such
limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment;
or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined [above] but is treated by a covered
entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. 3
The ADA does not define "major life activities,"' 4 but the Supreme Court has
defined the phrase as referring to "those activities that are of central importance
to most people's daily lives."41 The EEOC has defined "work" as a major life
activity.42 This is critically important to employees such as Williams because
many plaintiffs focusing on reasonable accommodations for regarded-as
individuals have relied on this particular major life activity.43 The Supreme
Court has summarized EEOC regulations by holding that an individual "must
be precluded from more than one type ofjob, a specialized job, or a particular
job of choice" to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working.44
Thus, plaintiffs such as Williams generally must establish that they were
regarded as having an impairment that would have precluded the plaintiff from
a range ofjobs.
38. Id. § 12102(2).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2() (2004).
40. ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 4:5 & n.34 (3d ed.
2003).
41. Id. (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002)).
42. Id. at § 4:5 & n.42 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i) (2004)).
43. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 762-63 (3d Cir.
2004) (discussing the plaintiffs allegation that he was substantially limited in the major life
activity of"working"); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(discussing the plaintiff's allegation that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of
"working").
44. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999) (cited in Williams, 380
F.3d at 763).
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B. Reasonable Accommodations
If a plaintiff can establish that he was regarded as disabled, he must then
prove that he was a "qualified individual., 45 The ADA defines this as an
individual "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that [the] individual holds or
desires. '"4 In essence, there must be a reasonable accommodation that would
enable the employee to perform the job in question. The ADA defines
"reasonable accommodation" with a nonexclusive list of'possibilities.47 Among
other things, a reasonable accommodation could include job restructuring,
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, or acquisition of
equipment or devices.48 The EEOC has stated that, in general, a reasonable
accommodation is "any change in the work environment or in the way things
are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal
employment opportunities.
49
C. Discrimination by the Employer
In making out a prima facie case, plaintiffs must also show that the
employer discriminated against them in some way.50 Discrimination can
include a failure to make reasonable accommodations to the "known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified.., employee [with a disability]. '" 51
Discrimination can also include "denying employment opportunities to [an]
employee.., if such denial is based on the need of [the employer] to make
reasonable accommodation., 5 2 A plaintiff must show, then, that the employer
regarded him as unable to perform many if not most of the class or range of
jobs that utilized his skills and that the plaintiff was capable of performing
these jobs with reasonable accommodations.
45. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 768 (discussing the plaintiff's proof that he was a qualified
individual); MODJESKA, supra note 40, at § 4:6 (discussing the prima facie element of qualified
status).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
47. See id. § 12111(9) (listing possible reasonable accommodations).
48. Id.
49. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (2004).
50. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004)
(stating that the third element of a prima facie discrimination case under the ADA is that the
plaintiff has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
52. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
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Some defendants, such as PHA, have argued that an employer should only
be required to reasonably accommodate the disability that the employer
perceives, not the disability or impairment from which the plaintiff actually
suffers.13 In refuting that argument, the Third Circuit noted that an employer
would be "liable if it wrongly regarded [the employee] as so disabled that he
could not work and therefore denied him a job.0 4 According to the court, if an
employer only had to accommodate the perceived disability, the employer could
always escape liability by regarding the employee as incapable of performing
any work, thus disqualifying the employee from making a discrimination
claim. 5
III. Setting the Stage For Williams: The Prior Decisions and Circuit Split
Opinions addressing accommodations for regarded-as employees
consistently fall into one of two categories; there is a bright line separation with
little variation between the holdings. To provide a clearer picture of the
separation, this Part will examine the leading court decisions creating the circuit
split. Because the Williams decision and others like it developed largely as a
response to the antiaccommodation courts, this Part will discuss the latter
holdings before presenting the Williams line of decisions.
A. Influential Commentary from the Third Circuit
An early accommodations case that became important for its influence,
despite its failure to produce a holding, is Deane v. Pocono Medical Center.56
In that case, the plaintiff was a nurse employed by the defendant medical
center.5 7 While lifting a resistant patient, she injured her right wrist, which
forced her to miss one year of work.5 8 Her doctor eventually allowed her to
53. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 769 (discussing the defendant's argument that it should
only be liable for the failure to reasonably accommodate the disability in the eyes of the
employer).
54. Id. at 769 (quoting Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 189-90 (3d Cir.
1999)).
55. See id. (arguing that the employee would never be able to demonstrate the existence of
a reasonable accommodation if the employer could regard him as incapable of performing any
work).
56. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
57. Id. at 141.
58. Id.
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return to "light duty" work that would not require her to lift more than twenty
pounds or perform repetitive manual tasks such as typing.59 The medical
center, after one conversation with Deane, decided that it could not
accommodate her at any position and terminated her.60 In her discrimination
suit, the plaintiff alleged that she was perceived as disabled by the center and
that the defendant discriminated against her because of its failure to reasonably
accommodate her perceived disability.6' The trial court decided that Deane was
neither actually nor regarded as disabled.62 Sitting en bane, the Third Circuit
reversed. The court found that questions of fact existed as to whether the
plaintiff was disabled and whether she was a qualified individual under the
63ADA. In making its findings, the circuit court specifically declined to decide
whether Deane was entitled to a reasonable accommodation.
64
Although Deane did not produce a holding on the issue, Judge Becker
made some important comments in a footnote.65 Becker acknowledged the
"considerable force" of the defendant's argument that reasonable
accommodations for regarded-as individuals would permit healthy employees
to demand changes in their work environments and would "create a windfall for
legitimate 'regarded as' disabled employees who, after disabusing their
employers of their misperceptions, would nonetheless be entitled to
accommodations that their similarly situated co-workers are not."
66
B. Weber v. Strippit, Inc.: An Antiaccommodation Ruling
from the Eighth Circuit
One of the leading cases on the antiaccommodation side of the split came
from the Eighth Circuit in Weber v. Strippit, Inc.67 In Weber, the plaintiff
suffered several hospital visits due to a heart condition and as a result was
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 142.
62. Id. at 141-42.
63. See id. at 145-48 (holding that there is a general issue of material fact as to whether
the plaintiff is qualified under the ADA, as well as to whether the plaintiff was regarded as
disabled).
64. Id at 140-41.
65. See id at 148 n.12 (discussing whether "regarded as" individuals are entitled to
reasonable accommodation).
66. Id.
67. Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2003).
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unable to fully perform his duties for his employer, Strippit, Inc. 68 On the
advice of his physician, who recommended that he recuperate for six months,
Weber refused Strippit's request that he relocate.69 Strippit declined to wait six
months and subsequently either terminated Weber or allowed him to abandon
his duties (the facts are not clear as to which occurred).70 Weber alleged, in
part, that Strippit believed he was disabled and refused to accommodate him.71
The court concluded, after a reasoned analysis, that reading the ADA to
mandate reasonable accommodations for individuals who are not actually
disabled would lead to differential treatment among similarly-situated
employees.72 Although conceding that, on its face, the ADA requires an
employer to provide reasonable accommodations for an employee who is
regarded as disabled, the court found that such differential treatment would
produce a bizarre result.73 According to Judge Byrne, "The ADA cannot
reasonably have been intended to create a disparity in treatment among
impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the right to reasonable
accommodations but granting to others, because of their employers'
misperceptions, a right to reasonable accommodations no more limited than
those afforded actually disabled employees. 74 Accordingly, the court decided
that a perceived disability does not warrant reasonable accommodations under
the ADA.75
C. Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas: The Ninth Circuit Agrees
The Ninth Circuit largely tracked Weber's analysis in deciding Kaplan v.
City of North Las Vegas.76 In Kaplan, the plaintiff was a police officer
68. Id. at 910.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 915-16.
72. See id. at 917 (finding that "[t]he ADA cannot reasonably have been intended to
create a disparity in treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees"); see also infra Part
IV.C (discussing the "bizarre results" arguments of the antiaccomnodation courts).
73. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907,917 (8th Cir. 2003) (arguing that a disparity
in treatment among similarly situated employees would be a bizarre result and that Congress
could not have intended such an outcome).
74. Id. at 917.
75. Id. at 917.
76. See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226,1232 (9th Cir. 2003) (following
the Weber court's reasoning).
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employed by the defendant city.77 After sustaining a hand injury, he became
unable to hold objects, such as a gun, in his right hand.78 Relying on a
misdiagnosis, the city concluded that Kaplan could not perform the essential
functions of the job and terminated him.7 9 Kaplan alleged that the city
improperly fired him and should have made reasonable accommodations for
him, even though he was not actually disabled.8 0 The court decided that,
notwithstanding the plain language of the ADA, Congress could not possibly
have intended to require accommodations to individuals who had no actual
disability."
The court in Kaplan argued first that it must "look beyond the literal
language" of the ADA because a formalistic reading would lead to "bizarre
results., 82 Agreeing with the Eighth Circuit's analysis and holding, the Kaplan
court argued that if it were to conclude that "regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled
to reasonable accommodation, "impaired employees would be better off under
the statute if their employers treated them as disabled even if they were not.
'"83
That would be a "troubling result," remarked the court, under a statute aimed at
decreasing "stereotypic assumptions. '"8 4 According to Kaplan, it would provide
employees a windfall "if they perpetuated their employers' misperception of a
disability. 85 Finally, the court argued that such a result would "compel
employers to waste resources unnecessarily.,
86
Two other circuits have reached the same holding with little or no
analysis. The Sixth Circuit has written that a finding that the plaintiff was only
regarded as disabled would obviate the defendant's responsibility to reasonably
accommodate her.8 7 The Fifth Circuit has stated simply that an "employer need
not provide reasonable accommodation to an employee who does not suffer
from a substantially limiting impairment merely because the employer thinks
77. Id. at 1227.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1229.
80. Id. at 1231.
81. See id. at 1232 ("If we were to conclude that 'regarded as' plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable accommodation, impaired employees would be better off under the statute if their
employers treated them as disabled even if they were not.").
82. Id. at 1232 (citing Royal Foods Co. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999).
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the employee has such an impairment. '88 Two circuits, the Second89 and the
Seventh, 9° have considered but passed on the issue.
D. Katz v. City Metal Co.: The Controversy Begins
Remarkably, for the first six years after the 1990 enactment of the ADA,
few judicial opinions addressed reasonable accommodations and perceived
disabilities. 91 As one court observed, judicial interpretations of the perceived
disability prong of the ADA were "hen's-teeth rare. 9 2  Most courts and
commentators credit the First Circuit's opinion in Katz v. City Metal Co. 93 with
being the original proaccommodation precedent, 94 and before Williams, it was
the sole circuit-level decision of its kind.
The plaintiff in Katz was a scrap metal salesman employed by the
defendant company.95 After suffering a heart attack and an extended hospital
stay, the plaintiff was fired.96 The district court entered judgment for the
defendant, deciding as a matter of law that the plaintiff did not have an actual
disability under the ADA. 9 7 The First Circuit noted that the plaintiff could
recover if he was regarded as disabled and if he could have performed his
duties with reasonable accommodations.98 Finding that the trial court did not
consider these factors, the court reversed and remanded. 99
88. Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998).
89. See Cameron v. Cmty. Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60,64 (2d Cir. 2003)
(raising the issue but declining to consider it unnecessarily).
90. See Mack v. Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
issue was not one that required decision at present).
91. See Moberly, supra note 27, at 610-11 (discussing the lack of judicial history of
perceived-as claims prior to Katz).
92. See id. (discussing the judicial history of perceived-as claims prior to Katz) (quoting
Cook v. R.I. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1993)).
93. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996).
94. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 773 (3d Cir.
2004) (citing Katz as the sole circuit court case to previously hold that "regarded as" plaintiffs
have a right to reasonable accommodation); Moberly, supra note 27, at 612 (stating that Katz
was the first opinion from a circuit court to address the issue).
95. Katz, 87 F.3d at 28.
96. Id. at 29.
97. Id. at 30.
98. Id. at 33.
99. Id. at 33-34.
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Katz, however, did not delve into any substantive analysis on the regarded-
as issue. 1°° Instead, it merely decided that the plaintiff's ability to perform with
reasonable accommodation, whether the plaintiff was actually or regarded-as
disabled, was a question for the jury.'0 ' Despite its subtleties, this decision
generated controversy, resulted in unsettled expectations, and invited
considerable refinement and expansion.'
02
E. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc.: A District Court Expands on Katz
Subsequently, several district court judges followed Katz and fleshed out
the arguments, setting the stage for the Williams decision. 0 3 Most notably,
Judge Block's sua sponte reconsideration of the issue in Jacques v. DiMarzio,
Inc. 104 offered a detailed analysis.l0 5 In Jacques, the plaintiff had suffered from
a long history of psychiatric impairments.' °6 She took several leaves of absence
due to emotional difficulties.10 7 Citing difficulties with workers, the company
terminated her, and she subsequently sued under the ADA antidiscrimination
provisions.10 8 The plaintiff alleged in part that she was regarded as disabled'0 9
and that she was not offered reasonable accommodations." l0 The court, in a sua
100. See Moberly, supra note 27, at 614 (commenting that Katz reached its conclusion
"with virtually no substantive analysis of an employer's duty to accommodate").
101. See Katz, 87 F.3d at 34 (remanding the case for a new trial to be retried under any or
all theories of disability asserted by the plaintiff).
102. See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(supplemental decision) (discussing the Katz decision and comparing it to the Deane decision);
Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (discussing, in
dicta, whether regarded-as employees are entitled to reasonable accommodation); Moberly,
supra note 27, at 604-10 (discussing new precedent on the issue of reasonable accommodations
for regarded-as employees).
103. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 2004)
("The better-reasoned district court decisions reach the same result.") (citing Jacques, 200 F.
Supp. 2d at 163-71 (supplemental decision), and Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co., 172 F.
Supp. 2d 212, 218-19 (D. Me. 2001)).
104. Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 163-71 (supplemental decision).
105. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 773 (finding the Jacques decision to be the most persuasive
in its analysis).
106. Jacques, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
107. Id. at 154.
108. Id. at 155.
109. Id. at 159-60.
110. Id. at 161.
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sponte supplemental decision, decided that the plaintiff was entitled to
reasonable accommodations to the extent that she was regarded as disabled."'
Judge Block wrote perhaps the most detailed analysis prior to Williams,
devoting some nine pages in the reporter to the issue of reasonable
accommodations for regarded-as employees. 1 2 First, the court argued, the
plain language of the statute does not differentiate between actual and regarded-
as individuals when requiring reasonable accommodations. 1' 3 Second, the
legislative history of the statute as well as Supreme Court decisions emphasize
that the ADA was designed to "redress insidious misperceptions of employee
disabilities stemming from prejudices and biases of employers and co-
workers."' 4  Third, the court argued, courts have required employers to
participate in an "interactive process" when looking for reasonable
accommodations for employees.1 5 This practical requirement, the court said, is
consistent with a view that the ADA requires accommodations for all
disabilities, real or perceived.!1 6 Finally, the court took on the Weber critique
directly." 7 It stated that, contrary to Weber's suggestions of "bizarre results,"
an employer's state of mind is often a factor in discrimination cases." 8 The
court also refuted Weber's prediction of employee abuse of the ADA by stating
that a "good faith requirement" is "implicit in the ADA's regulatory scheme."' 19
F. Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Department: The
Third Circuit Joins Katz
As discussed in Part I of this Note, Williams sued his employer under the
ADA alleging in part that, to the extent that he was perceived as disabled, he
was not given reasonable accommodations.12 0  The district court granted
111. Id. at 17 1.
112. See id. at 163-71 (discussing reasonable accommodations for regarded-as employees).
113. Id. at 166.
114. Id. at 167.
115. See id. at 168-70 (discussing the interactive process). For a discussion of the
interactive process, see infra Part V.A.
116. Id. at 170.
117. See id. at 170-71 (discussing the Weber arguments).
118. See id. at 170 (stating that plaintiff's claims under other discrimination statutes often
hinge on defendant's perceptions).
119. Id. at 171.
120. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751,766-68 (3d Cir. 2004)
(stating that the plaintiff argued that he was regarded as disabled and that he was qualified to
work with reasonable accommodations).
1773
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1759 (2005)
summary judgment for PHA, deciding that Williams was not disabled because
he was not significantly restricted in a major life activity.' 2 ' The court did not
reach the accommodation question. The Third Circuit reversed, deciding that
there was a material dispute of fact as to whether Williams was disabled.
122
The circuit court then proceeded to the question of whether Williams was
entitled to reasonable accommodations to the extent that he was regarded as
disabled.
123
The Third Circuit borrowed extensively from the Jacques decision in its
own analysis of the reasonable accommodation issue.'2 4 The court discussed
the issue in four parts. In the first part, the court examined the plain language
of the ADA.125 Judge Stapleton easily determined that the text of the ADA
does not distinguish between actually disabled and regarded-as disabled
individuals in requiring accommodation. 1
26
In the second part of its analysis, the court discussed the legislative history
of the ADA.127 Reinforcing its conclusion on the plain language, the court
quoted from a House of Representatives Report that articulated the reasons
behind the regarded-as prong.12 8 Adopting the rationales provided by the
Supreme Court in School Board v. Arline,129 the report stated that "although an
individual may have an impairment that does not in fact substantially limit a
major life activity, the reaction of others may prove just as disabling." 30 The
Third Circuit stated that the Williams case "demonstrates the wisdom of that
conclusion" because, but for the employer's misperception, the plaintiff would
have been eligible for a position at PHA.1
31
121. Id. at 755.
122. Id. at 768-69.
123. Id. at 772-76.
124. See id. at 773 ("We... find Judge Block's analysis in Jacques particularly persuasive,
and will largely track his approach. .. .
125. Id. at 774.
126. Id. at 774 (quoting Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir.
1999)).
127. Id. at 774.
128. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,453).
129. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). For a discussion of Arline, see infra Part
IV.B.3.
130. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
453).
131. See id. at 774 (arguing that Williams would have been eligible for a radio room
assignment if not for PHA's erroneous perception).
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In the third part, the court relied on the precedent set by Arline.'3 2 In
Arline, the Supreme Court held that the employer had "an affirmative
obligation [under the Rehabilitation Act] to make a reasonable accommodation"
for a regarded-as employee.' 33 Judge Stapleton went on to assert that the
"regarded as" sections of the Rehabilitation Act play a "virtually identical role"
in the statutory scheme as the "regarded as" sections of the ADA.' 34 In
addition, said the court, it is well established that the ADA must be read to
"grant at least as much protection" as the Rehabilitation Act.135 Therefore,
regarded-as employees under the ADA "are entitled to reasonable
accommodation in the same way as are those who are actually disabled.
1 36
In the final part of its analysis, the Williams court discussed the "windfall"
proposition. 137 The court found little difficulty with the defendant's argument
that the plaintiff would receive a windfall accommodation by being perceived
as disabled. 138 It reiterated the fact that Williams was denied the opportunity to
work because of PHA's misperception. 139 Arguing that a similarly situated
employee who was not wrongly perceived would have been given the
opportunity to work, the court concluded that "[t]his is precisely the type of
discrimination the 'regarded as' prong literally protects from."' 40 Accordingly,
the Third Circuit held that the ADA requires reasonable accommodations for
those regarded as disabled. 141
IV. Analysis of the Williams Decision
Claims arising under the ADA can be difficult to analyze. The Third
Circuit acknowledged as much in its introduction to Taylor v. Pathmark Stores,
Inc. when it said that, because of its structure and content, the ADA "is often a
difficult statute for courts and employers to interpret and, sometimes, to
132. See id. at 775 (discussing, in Part V.C of the opinion, the Supreme Court's decision in
Arline).
133. Id. at 775 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 n. 19).
134. Id. at 775.
135. Id. at 775 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998)).
136. Id. at 775.
137. Id. at 775-76.
138. See id. (concluding, in one paragraph, that the facts of the case would present no
windfall).
139. See id. at 775 ("Williams was specifically denied such an assignment because of the
erroneous perception of his disability.").
140. Id. at 775-76.
141. Id. at 776.
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follow. 142 This Part will discuss the Williams court's interpretations of this
difficult statute and will argue that those interpretations are correct. It will
contend that the plain language of the statute requires reasonable
accommodations for those regarded-as disabled. It will further contend that the
legislative history of the ADA supports the plain language reading. The
Supreme Court decision in School Board v. Arline strongly suggests such a
result. Finally, this Part will conclude that absurd results do not necessarily
flow from the Williams interpretation.
A. The Plain Language of the Statute
Amid the disagreements and differences brought forth by the circuits,
there is at least one point on which courts have agreed. All courts that have
addressed the question have found that, on its face, the ADA requires
reasonable accommodation to individuals regarded as disabled.143 Under the
ADA, an employer cannot discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability.'"4 Discrimination can include a failure to make a reasonable
accommodation for a qualified individual with a disability, 145 and the ADA
does not differentiate between actual disabilities and perceived disabilities.'46
The term "disability," as defined in the ADA, covers both an actual disability
and "being regarded as having such an impairment.' 47 In addition, the
reasonable accommodation requirement is written to apply to a "disability," and
does not include separate provisions for both actual and regarded-as
142. Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1999).
143. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir.
2004) (noting that all courts would agree that the ADA does not distinguish between actually
disabled and "regarded as" disabled individuals); Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d
1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the ADA requires reasonable accommodation to
qualified individuals with a disability and that there is no differentiation, for purposes of
"qualified individual with a disability," between actually disabled and "regarded as" disabled
individuals).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
145. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Although not relevant here, this provision in the code does
create one affirmative defense. An employer does not have to make a reasonable
accommodation that would impose an "undue hardship on the operation of the business." Id.
146. See id. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (defining "disability" as both a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, as well as being regarded as having
such an impairment); see also Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 (discussing the plain language of the
ADA and determining that it mandates reasonable accommodations for persons regarded as
disabled).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c) (2000).
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disabilities. 4  The disability determination is a threshold issue, 14 9 and once an
employee is determined to be disabled under the ADA, he is protected from
discrimination.150 To read the Act otherwise would be to conflate separate and
distinct provisions.' 5 The inescapable conclusion, say the courts, is that the
statute provides for reasonable accommodations for those regarded as
disabled. 152
Understandably, some courts have not found this conclusion to be
sufficiently persuasive. As one appellate court reflected, "The ADA presents
subtle issues of statutory interpretation, far more subtle and difficult.., than
those prescribed under the other anti-discrimination statutes.' 53 The Kaplan
court refused to equate the "absence of a stated distinction" with an "explicit
instruction by Congress."'' 54 Much has been written on the weight that should
be accorded plain (or seemingly plain) statutory language. It is generally
agreed that if the words of a statute are unambiguous, there is nothing for the
courts to do but to follow the language. 155 What the Kaplan line of decisions
seem to be doing, then, is ignoring the plain language to achieve a preferred
outcome.
There is some support for this in the traditional canons of statutory
construction, but the support falls short of providing a clear interpretation. One
148. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining "discriminate," in part, as not making reasonable
accommodations for a qualified individual with a disability).
149. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 863 (1st Cir. 1998)
(interpreting the ADA to require an employee's impairments to be evaluated in their untreated,
unaccommodated state when determining whether or not the employee is disabled under the
ADA).
150. See id. ("Once a person is determined to be covered by the ADA, then that person has
a right not to be discriminated against in employment (inter alia) on the basis of her disability,
as long as she is qualified for the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.").
151. See id. (stating that two different provisions of the ADA would be conflated if an
accommodation were taken into account when determining whether a disability exists).
152. See, e.g., Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(stating that the "plain language of the statute does not distinguish between 'regarded as'
disabled plaintiffs and actually disabled plaintiffs").
153. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 A.D. Cases (BNA) 198,216 (3d Cir. 1997) (Becker, J.,
dissenting), rev'd on reh 'g, 7 A.D. Cases (BNA) 555 (3d Cir. 1997), ajfd on reh 'g en banc,
142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998).
154. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
155. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (stating that
Congress's language must ordinarily be followed if its will has been expressed in "reasonably
plain" terms); Maura D. Corrigan & J. Michael Thomas, "Dice Loading" Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 231, 233 (2003) (stating that most judges agree
that statutory interpretation ends if the legislature has clearly spoken).
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such canon is the rule that a remedial statute should be liberally construed.
1 56
In particular, courts have stated that federal antidiscrimination laws, including
the ADA, should be liberally construed to effectuate their remedial purposes.
157
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Kaplan court is correct and
Congress did not intend to require accommodations for those regarded as
disabled, 158 a liberal reading of the statute may be appropriate. However, this
rule of construction raises major questions. As the Seventh Circuit has stated, a
liberal construction of a remedial statute is not one that "flies in the face of the
structure of the statute." 59 Here, the structure is straightforward; the ADA
simply does not differentiate between impairment by actual disability and
impairment by being "regarded as" disabled in its definition of "disability.''
6
0
Justice Antonin Scalia has argued that the liberal construction rule is vague at
best, for there is no real definition of a "liberal construction.' 6' At worst,
wrote Scalia, it is simply a tool to achieve a desired result.
162
Another doctrine that may have influenced the Kaplan decision is the
court's supposed duty to correct Congressional slips when called upon to do
so. 163 Assuming again for the sake of argument that Congress did not intend
the plain language of the statute to read the way it does, one could argue that it
156. See Corrigan & Thomas, supra note 155, at 232 (discussing Justice Scalia's distrust of
the rule that remedial legislation should be strictly construed); see also Antonin Scalia, Assorted
Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 581, 581-86 (1990)
(attacking the usefulness of such a rule).
157. See Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 983 (10th Cir. 2002)
(stating that the ADA should be liberally construed to effectuate its antidiscriminatory purpose);
Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1231-32 (5th Cir. 1996) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (discussing
the interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) (citing, e.g., Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (discussing interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964)).
158. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003) (asserting that
Congress cannot have reasonably intended for those regarded as disabled to be entitled to
reasonable accommodations).
159. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining "disability" for purposes of the ADA to
mean, inter alia, "a physical or mental impairment" or "being regarded as having such an
impairment").
161. See Scalia, supra note 156, at 582 ("How 'liberal' is liberal, and how 'strict' is
strict?").
162. See id. at 586 (arguing that the liberal interpretation rule is popular because it can be
used to reach the result the court wishes to achieve).
163. See KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS
47 (1999) (discussing the courts' practices of correcting errors when the legislative history
strongly suggests that one was made).
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was an oversight that should be corrected.164 The Supreme Court held as such
in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 65 a famous and exhaustive
statutory interpretation case decided in 1892. In Holy Trinity, the Court found
that a contract which was void by the plain language of a statute was
nonetheless valid under the statute's spirit.166 In language akin to Kaplan's, the
Court stated that it is "a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers." 1
67
Kent Greenawalt, in his text on statutory interpretation, discussed several
arguments against a court taking such liberties in the name of upholding the
supposed purposes of a statute. 68 First, legislators are typically more careful
with specific language than they are with general purposes. 169 This could be
particularly true with legislation such as the ADA, which has a long history of
revisions and adjustments traceable from the Civil Rights Act through the
Rehabilitation Act.1 70 A court, then, should follow clear specific provisions
before following overriding purposes, even unambiguously stated purposes.' 7'
Greenawalt also discussed the proposition that "much legislation in the
United States results from self-interested pressure and compromise.'
72
Legislation passes through Congress for a variety of reasons, argued
164. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the legislative history of the ADA in which Congress
apparently failed to discuss the possibility of reasonable accommodations for those regarded as
disabled).
165. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457(1892). In Holy Trinity, an
Act of February 26, 1885 prohibited "the importation or migration of any foreigners and
aliens... under contract or agreement... to perform labor or service of any kind in the United
States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia." Id. at 458 (quoting Alien Contract Labor
Laws, ch. 164, § 2, 23 Stat. 332 (1885) (repealed 1952)). The appellant was aNew York church
that entered into a contract with a pastor residing in England, under which the pastor would
serve the church. Id. The United States claimed that the contract was void. Id. The New York
Circuit Court agreed that it was void under the plain language of the statute. Id. The Supreme
Court reversed, stating among other things that the legislative history and the evil intended to be
remedied by the statute cannot include the contract in question. See id. at 465 (stating that the
intent of Congress was simply to "stay the influx of this cheap unskilled labor").
166. See id. at 472 (holding the contract valid despite the plain language of the statute).
167. Id. at 459; see Kaplan v. City ofN. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that the court must look beyond the language of the statute if it would lead to absurd
results).
168. See GREENAWALT, supra note 163, at 50, 107 (discussing the arguments for and
against ignoring a statute's plain language).
169. Id. at 50.
170. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the legislative history of the ADA).
171. GREENAWALT, supra note 163, at 50.
172. Id.
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Greenawalt, some of which may be obvious and some of which may not be so
obvious. Moreover, different legislators may approve legislation for different
reasons. 173 Bearing this in mind, wrote Greenawalt, it would be dangerous to
depend on general purposes to the detriment of the plain language. 174
B. The Legislative History of the ADA and the Arline Decision
Even if a court decided that it was within its duty and power to remedy
inadvertent drafting errors, it is not at all clear that the result here is inadvertent. As
the Williams court argues, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
regarded-as employees to be afforded reasonable accommodations.'7 5 This is
especially true when read in light of School Board v. Arline, as this Part will
discuss.176 However, this Part will begin with a discussion of the Act's background,
in the process arguing that this background supports the result in Williams.
1. The Legislative History of the "Regarded As" Prong
Unlike the newer "reasonable accommodations" provision, the "regarded as"
language in the ADA has an established lineage. 177 The ADA's predecessor, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,178 concerned itself with protecting the "handicapped"
against discrimination stemming not only from overt prejudice, but also from
"archaic attitudes and laws" and from "the fact that the American people are simply
unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with
handicaps."' 179 Congress reflected this concern with language in the Rehabilitation
173. See id. at 107 (stating that different legislators may or may not have intentions, but the
body as a whole has only outcomes (quoting Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cin.
L. REv. 533, 547 (1983))).
174. See id. at 50 (stating that between stated purposes and specific language, arguably the
specific language should carry the day).
175. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004)
(arguing that the legislative history of the ADA supports reasonable accommodations for
regarded-as employees).
176. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing School Board v. Arline).
177. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 775 (stating that it is a well-established rule that the ADA
must be read "to grant at least as much protection as provided by... the Rehabilitation Act")
(citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998)). But see Lamie v. United States Trustee,
540 U.S. 526, 527 (2004) ("The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing
statutory text and not the predecessor statutes." (citation omitted)).
178. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000)).
179. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 50
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Act that is virtually identical to the "regarded as" language in the ADA." 0 The
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act makes clear that Congress believed
individuals who "do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as
having... may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their being regarded as
handicapped."''
The Rehabilitation Act, however, was limited in its application to programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance, the executive agencies, and the U.S.
Postal Service.' 8 2 As a possible reaffirmation and expansion of its concerns,
Congress echoed the purposes of the "regarded as" prong when the broader ADA
was enacted. 8 3 The legislative history expressly indicates that the ADA uses the
same "regarded as" test set forth in the Rehabilitation Act.'8 4 Congress described
the rationale for this test by adopting the Supreme Court's interpretation in the
landmark Rehabilitation Act case of School Board v. Arline,'8 5 which found that
"Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment.'
I86
2. The Legislative History of the "Reasonable Accommodations" Provisions
The ADA requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to
disabled employees unless it would cause an undue hardship 87  An
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6400).
180. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (2000) (defining any person who "is regarded as having...
an impairment" as a "handicapped individual"); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining "being
regarded as having ... an impairment" as a "disability").
181. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 n.4 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 39 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390).
182. Allen Dudley, Comment, Rights to Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act for "RegardedAs"Disabledlndividuals, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 389,394
(1999) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
183. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 29(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
452 (discussing the "regarded as" prong).
184. Id.
185. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). See infra Part IV.B.3 for a discussion of
Arline.
186. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at30(1990), reprintedin 1990U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,453
(quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 284); see also Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380
F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing the Arline decision and finding that the decision
supports the proposition that "regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable
accommodations).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (describing the provision for reasonable
accommodations); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrrY COMM'N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT
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accommodation, according to the EEOC, is generally a "change in the work
environment or in the way things are customarily done that [ensures] equal
employment opportunities." '188  The agency's definition of "reasonable
accommodations" includes modifications or adjustments that "enable [a disabled
employee] to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by
its other similarly situated employees without disabilities," 189 or that "enable a
[disabled employee] to perform the essential functions of [his or her] position." 190
Such an accommodation may include "permitting the use of accrued paid leave"
for treatment,1 91 job restructuring by reallocating marginal job functions, 192 or
reassignment to a vacant position,1
93 as Mr. Williams requested.1
94
Unlike the "regarded as" provisions of the ADA, the "reasonable
accommodation" provision is arguably what sets it apart from, rather than
connects it to, other antidiscrimination legislation.195 Neither the Rehabilitation
Act nor the Civil Rights Act include any explicit reasonable accommodation
requirement. 96  The ADA provisions break from the past by advocating
differential treatment, not equal treatment, as a form of equality. 197 If identical
GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILrnES ACT, EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 6908A, at 5467-4 (Oct. 17, 2002)
(discussing the general principles regarding reasonable accommodations and the ADA).
188. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrrY COMM'N, supra note 187, at 5467-4 (quoting 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (1997)) (alterations added).
189. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(iii) (2004).
190. Id. § 1630.2(o)(ii).
191. Id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 757 (3d Cir. 2004)
(stating that the plaintiff requested an assignment to the PHA radio room until his psychiatric
evaluation was over).
195. See Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861,862 (2004) (stating that both supporters and
critics of the ADA have generally viewed the reasonable accommodation provisions as different
from provisions in predecessor laws).
196. See id. at 861 (stating that the ADA "appeared" to deviate from previous legislation in
its inclusion of reasonable accommodations provisions). It is important to note that, although
the Rehabilitation Act itself contains no provisions for reasonable accommodation, the Supreme
Court and agency regulations have interpreted the Act to include some requirement for
reasonable accommodations. See Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,412 (1979)
("It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on continuing past requirements and
practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity
to participate in a covered program."); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (2004) (defining a "qualified
handicapped person" as "a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the job in question").
197. See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EAsTwooD, CusToPHER REEvES
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treatment burdens some individuals more than others, then the employer has not
treated the burdened individuals equally.
198
As Professor Mary Crossley has argued, this diversion has been used
incorrectly by commentators and judges to describe reasonable accommodations
as "special benefits" designed only for the "truly disabled."' 99 Such a belief is
somewhat inconsistent with the EEOC's statement that "the duty to provide
reasonable accommodation is a fundamental statutory requirement because of the
nature of discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities," and that
accommodation "removes workplace barriers for individuals with disabilities.,200
Here, the agency is suggesting perhaps that reasonable accommodations are
designed to benefit all disabled individuals, not just those that request
accommodation. Professor Crossley argued that reasonable accommodations
remove structural barriers in place that discriminate against disabilities, and that
the failure to reasonably accommodate is thus equivalent to "real"
discrimination. 20 1 Society constantly accommodates the needs of the nondisabled
majority, she argues, because the existing workplace is built around those
needs.20 2 Thus, conventional workplace practices and environments discriminate
by advantaging the nondisabled over the disabled.20 3
3. School Board v. Arline: Influential Commentary
In making its findings, the Williams court relied extensively on the Supreme
Court's decision in School Board v. Arline.204 Arline involved a schoolteacher
& THE CASE AGAINST DIsABILIrY RIGHTs 205-22 (2003) (discussing the factors within the ADA
that contribute to its susceptibility to criticism).
198. See Crossley, supra note 195, at 886-87 (discussing the "minority group" model of
disability that asserts that justice demands unequal treatment as a form of equal treatment).
199. See id. at 864 (suggesting that an analysis of the purpose of reasonable
accommodations may help to counteract the commentators that have sought to limit its use).
200. EQUAL EMLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 187, at 5467-4.
201. See Crossley, supra note 195, at 890 (endorsing the findings of disability theorists that
the maintenance of existing barriers is real discrimination and that therefore the obligation to
provide accommodations for disabilities is nothing more than an order to stop discriminating).
202. See id. at 892-983 (discussing the reasons why nondisabled individuals perceive
accommodations as special and how conventional structures advantage the nondisabled).
203. See id. at 894 (stating that the standard social environment is discriminatory by
allowing access to nondisabled people, while excluding disabled people, and that employers
who maintain these environments discriminate by continuing to use these mechanisms of
discrimination).
204. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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who was dismissed because she had tuberculosis, a contagious disease. 20 5 The
schoolteacher filed suit under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging discrimination.
20 6
The employer argued that it did not discriminate because the plaintiff was fired
due to her contagiousness, not because of the disability itself.20 7 The trial court
found no disability, but the court of appeals reversed, stating that the plaintiff's
disability fell within the statute.20 8 The appeals court remanded for further
findings on whether the plaintiff was otherwise qualified for a position with
reasonable accommodation.20 9 The Supreme Court affirmed.210
In affirming the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court discussed the
legislative history of the "regarded as" prong at length, stating that "the...
definition reflected Congress's concern with protecting the handicapped against
discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also from 'archaic
attitudes and laws.' 21' The Court went on to say that it would be unfair to allow
an employer to distinguish between the effects of a disease on others and the
effects of a disease on a patient. 2 2 According to the Court:
Congress was as concerned about the effect of an impairment on others as it
was about its affect on the individual.... Congress extended coverage... to
those individuals who are simply 'regarded as having' a physical or mental
impairment.... Such an impairment might not diminish a person's physical
or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's
ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the
impairment.
213
The Court also discussed the overall scheme of the Rehabilitation Act, stating that
allowing the discrimination of the type practiced by the defendant "would be
inconsistent with the basic purpose of [the Act], which is to ensure that
handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the
prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others., 214 The Court treated the
disability question distinctly from the reasonable accommodation question, stating
in a footnote that "[a] person who poses a significant risk of communicating an
infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for
205. Id. at 276.
206. Id. at 276-77.
207. Id. at 281.




212. Id. at 282.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 284.
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his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk. ', 2 15 The
Court remanded the case to determine if the plaintiff was in fact otherwise
qualified for a position with or without reasonable accommodation.216
As Williams stated, Arline controls similar cases under the ADA because the
regarded-as prongs in both statutes "play a virtually identical role."217 Courts
have uniformly looked to cases decided under one statute when deciding cases
under another.218 The ADA also explicitly states that the ADA should apply the
same level of standards as the Rehabilitation Act.219
Professor Michelle Travis, the author of several articles on the issue,
disagrees with the use of Arline for precedential value in cases such as
Williams. 220 According to Travis, the Arline case was decided under the "record
of' (a disability) prong, not the "regarded as" prong.221 However, the opinion's
importance derives not from its narrow holding but from its treatment of a
plaintiff without an actual disability. The defendant in Arline conceded that the
plaintiff had a record of a disability and argued instead that the plaintiff was
terminated because of "the employer's reluctance to expose its other employees
and its clientele to the threat of infection. 2 22 The Court spent much of the
opinion responding to that reason by reinforcing the importance of the "regarded
as" prong (not the "record of' prong) of the Rehabilitation Act.223
C. The Absurd Results Doctrine
The Kaplan opinion states that the court must look beyond a literal
interpretation if it leads to an absurd result.224 Judge Gould argued that affording
215. Id. at 287 n.16.
216. Id. at 289.
217. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004)
218. MODJESKA, supra note 40, at § 4:1 & nn. 19-20.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (2000).
220. See Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the Deck? The
"Unfair Advantage" Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REv. 901,933 n. 125
(2000) (citing cases that have used Arline to argue that the Supreme Court has reached the
conclusion that reasonable accommodations are required for regarded-as employees).
221. Id. Note that Travis may have since retreated from this position, if only slightly. See
Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes", 55
VAND. L. REv. 481, 550 (2002) (stating that Arline was the first interpretation of the "regarded
as" prong of the Rehabilitation Act).
222. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 n.6 (1987).
223. See id. at 282-86 (discussing the perceived disability provision of the Rehabilitation
Act and its legislative history).
224. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Royal
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reasonable accommodations to those merely regarded as disabled would create
a disparity among those employees who are misperceived and similarly situated
employees who are correctly perceived.225 It would be absurd, he argued, for a
statute aimed at decreasing stereotypes to require disparate treatment based on
stereotypic assumptions.226 Finding such a result sufficiently absurd, the court
refused to follow the literal interpretation of the Act.
227
The "absurd results" doctrine-sometimes referred to as "bizarre
results"-is a mildly controversial doctrine and is not without its detractors.228
It has a long history with the federal courts, though, and has been used in one
form or another by the Supreme Court since at least 1876.29 Its longevity
alone is enough to give the doctrine credibility; as Justice Scalia has noted,
there is a certain amount of validity that comes with age.230 However, there are
several reasons why the absurd results doctrine does not easily apply here.
Foods Co., Inc. v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001)). Justice Antonin
Scalia has been one of the more vocal advocates for this approach. See Dudley, supra note 182,
at 415 nn.240-43 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia's views on statutory interpretation).
In Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), Justice Scalia argued that, when
confronted with "a statute which, if interpreted literally, produces an absurd.., result," the
court must look beyond the text and decide whether Congress considered such a result. Id. at
527 (Scalia, J., concurring). If the absurdity was "unthought of," Scalia continued, it would
justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of the words. Id.; see also ANTON SCAUA,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
CouRTs AND THE LAw 23 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("A text should not be construed strictly,
and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it
fairly means.").
225. See Kaplan, 323 F.3dat 1232 (citing Weberv. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907,917 (8th
Cir. 1999)) (agreeing with the Eighth Circuit that the ADA cannot reasonably have been
intended to create disparities in treatment among similarly situated employees).
226. See id. (stating that such a ruling would be a "troubling result" under a statute aimed
at decreasing stereotypic assumptions).
227. Id. at 1232-33. The court did concede that "it is not an easy question because of the
language of the statute." Id.
228. See Corrigan & Thomas, supra note 155, at 238 ("We are not governed in a fair,
democratic manner if 'the meaning of a law [is] determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather
than what the lawgiver promulgated."' (quoting Maier v. Gen. Tel. Co., 645 N.W.2d 654, 654
(Mich. 2002) (Corrigan, C.J., concurring))); cf supra note 224 (discussing Justice Scalia's
support for the "absurd results" doctrine).
229. See Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold & Silver Mining Co., 93 U.S. 634, 640-41 (1876)
(deciding that the literal interpretation of a federal act granting land to the state of Nevada, with
the qualification that it did not apply to lands previously sold or granted, did not grant a better
title than a newer one held by a miner because Congress could not possibly have intended to
exclude only past grants when no land had been granted in the past).
230. See Scalia, supra note 156, at 583 (conceding that rules of construction acquire "a sort
of prescriptive validity" over time because the legislature presumably comes to depend on them
when writing statutes).
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The Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine should only be used
when it would be consistent with legislative purpose.2 3' In fact, the doctrine's
origins can be traced to a search for legislative purpose, when the Supreme
Court decided that Congress could not possibly have intended a federal land
grant statute to apply to lands previously granted.232 As discussed in Part IV.B
above, the legislative purpose of the ADA contemplates a strong enforcement
of the "regarded as" prong and the "reasonable accommodations" provision,
233
and any interpretation which would weaken that enforcement would be out of
line with the Act's purposes.234
The absurd results argument sometimes takes a slightly different form.
Courts that argue against accommodating perceived disabilities, and the
employers that defend against such actions, have made the argument that such
an accommodation would result in a "windfall." for nondisabled employees.
235
The argument has been extended by scholarly commentary as well. 236 In
Kaplan, Judge Gould explained that the windfall would be a "troubling result
under a statute aimed at decreasing 'stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of [people with disabilities].' 237 Kaplan argued that
entitling "regarded as" plaintiffs to reasonable accommodations would not
231. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,575 (1982) ("Interpretations of
a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations
consistent with legislative purpose are available." (emphasis added)).
232. See Heydenfeldt, 93 U.S. at 638 (analyzing the legislative intent behind a land grant
and refusing to follow the literal reading of some of the grant's provisions because they did not
comport with that intent).
233. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the legislative intent behind the ADA, the "regarded
as" prong, and the "reasonable accommodations" language).
234. See infra Part VI (concluding that reasonable accommodations should be afforded to
those individuals who are regarded as disabled).
235. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing the defendant's "windfall theory"); Kaplan v. City ofN. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226,
1232 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Taylor v. Pathmaxk Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999))
(arguing that requiring reasonable accommolations for those "regarded as" disabled would
"improvidently provide those employees a windfall if they perpetuated their employers'
misperception of a disability"); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999)
(arguing that if the plaintiff received a reasonable accommodation for a perceived disability, he
would be entitled to accommodations that no similarly situated employees would enjoy); Deane
v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (acknowledging the
persuasiveness of the defendant's "windfall" argument but declining to reach the issue).
236. See Travis, supra note 220, at 990-91 (theorizing that the "windfall" would likely be
small but may adversely affect morale among coworkers).
237. Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000)).
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encourage employees or employers to have a clear understanding of employees'
talents.23
It is difficult to see how one could reconcile the mechanisms of the ADA
with the idea that employers should be able to discriminate against employees
they perceive as disabled. This would lead to a rise in the number of
improperly motivated employment decisions that the ADA could not protect
against. 239 The effect of this, as the Williams case shows, would be that
misperceived individuals would be barred from working whereas similarly
situated individuals who are not misperceived would be allowed to work.24
Given that antidiscrimination laws exist to correct inequality by
discrimination, 24' an employee who is discriminated against should have legal
recourse whether or not he actually needs an accommodation.
242
In addition, eliminating the reasonable accommodations requirement
would do nothing to encourage employers to correctly perceive employees. As
the Williams court argues, an employer could easily perceive an employee as
incapable of doing the required work and subsequently terminate the
employee.243 Such an employer would face no adverse action against it and no
discouragement to refrain from such clear discrimination. In contrast, an
employer who was required to accommodate a perceived disability could not
use such intentional misperception as a defense.
Finally, in requiring reasonable accommodations for those regarded as
disabled, the ADA broadens the base of potential plaintiffs who are able to
correct the societal barriers faced by disabled individuals. As Judge Becker has
argued, "The elimination of prejudice and ignorance is integral to ensuring that
otherwise qualified individuals are not excluded from the workplace. '244 The
238. Id.
239. See Travis, supra note 220, at 994 (arguing that regarded-as employees should be
protected by the ADA to the extent that it requires reasonable accommodation).
240. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2004).
241. See Crossley, supra note 195, at 897 (asserting that it is a major concern of
antidiscrimination laws to remedy the inequality of opportunity that comes from segregating
practices).
242. See Travis, supra note 220, at 995 ("Because the employer's intent is just as bad
regardless of whether the perceived disability plaintiff needs an accommodation or not, both
employees should have some form of legal recourse.").
243. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 769 (stating that an employer could regard an employee as
incapable of performing any work, and the employee's ADA claim would always fail because he
would never be able to prove the existence of any vacant, funded position he was capable of
performing in the eyes of the employer).
244. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 A.D. Cases (BNA) 198,216 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd
on reh'g, 7 A.D. Cases (BNA) 555 (3d Cir. 1997), affidon reh'g en banc, 142 F.3d 138 (3d
Cir. 1998).
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ADA was designed to counteract discrimination in various forms.
2 45
Congress's decision to include the failure to reasonably accommodate in the
definition of "discriminate" is consistent with equating the maintenance of
existing barriers with "real" discrimination.246 The enforcement of reasonable
accommodations requirements for regarded-as employees would enable
employees to challenge those barriers created by prejudice and ignorance, the
same barriers that the ADA was created to combat.247 Those with actual
disabilities are benefited by the systematic removal of structural barriers in the
workplace.248 When reasonable alterations are available to procedures and
facilities that would assist disabled individuals, it is unimportant whether or not
those alterations arise from a disabled person's difficulties with the existing
systems. What is important is that the systems change.
It is useful to note that, in Williams and almost every other case
discussed in this Note, the employees were not simply looking for additional
benefits over and above what is afforded nondisabled employees. Rather,
they sought to work.249  As Judge Stapleton wrote in Williams, "The
employee whose limitations are perceived accurately gets to work, while
Williams is sent home unpaid., 250 If the PHA had accurately perceived
Williams's impairment, it likely would have been able to accommodate him
and he would not have lost his job.25' On a practical level then, an abstract
245. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 2004)
(arguing that the legislative history of the ADA suggests Congress's concern that
misperceptions can be just as disabling as actual disabilities).
246. Crossley, supra note 195, at 890.
247. See id. (stating that an order by the court making reasonable accommodations,
equivalent to an order to "stop discriminating," requires employers not only to stop building
exclusionary barriers, but also to remove barriers already in place).
248. See id. at 889-98 (arguing that the failure to accommodate constitutes actual
discrimination).
249. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 757 (3d Cir.
2004) (stating that the plaintiff requested but did not receive an assignment to a position in the
"radio room"); Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the plaintiff was terminated because of an inability to use a firearm, according to the
employer); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that the
plaintiff was fired for not being able to work, according to the employer); Deane v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (stating that the plaintiff was fired
because, according to the employer, she could not be accommodated); Katz v. City Metal Co.,
87 F.3d 26, 29 (1 st Cir. 1996) (stating that the plaintiff, after being discharged, unsuccessfully
requested a return to work on a part-time basis with a reduction in salary and with whatever
accommodatiotns the company would make); Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987)
(noting that, according to the employer, the plaintiff was terminated because of the employer's
reluctance to expose its other employees to the threat of infection).
250. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 775 (3d Cir. 2004).
251. See id. (stating that the plaintiff was specifically denied an assignment because of the
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argument about whether Congress intended nondisabled individuals to be
afforded accommodations does not comport with reality. Without Williams-
like protections, if an employer mistakenly believes that an employee is so
disabled that he or she cannot be reasonably accommodated and still perform
the essential duties of the position, that employer would be within his rights
to dismiss the employee.252 Reading the ADA to allow this effect would
work counter to one of the central aims of the Act-providing "clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.
2 53
V. Improving on the Williams Decision
The most powerful critique of the Williams approach can be stated
simply: If accommodations are provided to employees who are incorrectly
perceived but not to employees who are correctly perceived, employees
would have some incentive to see that their employers incorrectly perceive
them; alternatively, they would have no incentive to correct possibly
254discriminatory views. A more active use of existing judicially developed
mechanisms, however, would prevent this problem. This Part focuses on two
related mechanisms, the "interactive process" requirement and a limited
defense developed by the Third Circuit, and the solutions those mechanisms
provide. As the following discussion illustrates, these mechanisms also serve
two related and equally important functions-they work to facilitate the
purposes of the ADA by encouraging efficient restructuring of discriminatory
practices, and they also provide clear, consistent rules for employers and
courts to follow.
erroneous perception of his disability).
252. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing the possible "perceiving away"
tactic by employers).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). A complete discussion on how the Kaplan reading
conflicts with the disparate impact theory of the ADA is beyond the scope of this Note and
could likely fill a Note of its own. For more information on disparate impact theory and
reasonable accommodation, see generally Crossley, supra note 195.
254. See Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226,1232(9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]t would
improvidently provide those employees a windfall if they perpetuated their employers'
misperception of a disability."); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir.
1999) (noting the bizarre result when one impaired employee receives a "windfall" but other
impaired employees do not).
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A. The Interactive Process
Many circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit in an opinion with
which Judge Gould concurred, have decided that both the employer and the
employee must work together to find an appropriate accommodation when
required. 2 5 The "interactive process" described by courts is not a part of the
ADA. In fact, the Act gives no substantive guidance on finding a reasonable
accommodation.256 This interactive process requirement is supported, however,
by the EEOC's regulations regarding application of the ADA.257
The EEOC regulations state that "to determine the appropriate reasonable
accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an
informal, interactive process with the [disabled] individual. 25 1 The regulatory
language could be construed as a recommendation rather than a requirement,
but courts confronted with the issue have uniformly held that it is a requirement
once the employee has requested an accommodation or the employer has
recognized a need for an accommodation. 59 One court explained the weak
255. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 771 (3d Cir. 2004)
(stating that the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that an employer has a duty to engage in an
interactive process with an employee who requests accommodation); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,
228 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2000) (examining the legislative history of the ADA and the
EEOC guidelines and finding that employers are required to engage in an interactive process
when determining reasonable accommodations), rev'don other grounds sub nom. U.S. Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638,
648 n. 12 (1 st Cir. 2000) (stating that the duty to provide an interactive process is a continuing
one); Walter v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 99-2622, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26875, at *11-12
(4th Cir. Oct. 25, 2000) (unpub.) (stating that an employer cannot be found in violation of the
ADA simply by a showing that it failed to engage in the interactive process, but it can be found
in violation if it is shown that it failed to identify the appropriate accommodation for a disabled
individual by failing to engage in the interactive process); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc.,
188 F.3d 944, 951-52 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that the employer is required to engage in an
interactive process with the employee to determine a reasonable accommodation). But see John
R. Autry, Note, Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA: Are Employers Required to
Participate in the Interactive Process? The Courts Say "Yes" but the Law Says "No", 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 665, 697 (2004) (concluding that, contrary to what courts have stated about the
importance of the interactive process, all of the appeals courts that have commented on the issue
have refused to impose ADA liability independent of the availability of a reasonable
accommodation).
256. See Autry, supra note 255, at 666 (stating that Congress failed to provide any
information regarding the proper method by which reasonable accommodations are fashioned).
257. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2004) (describing the guidelines for employers in
complying with ADA requirements).
258. Id. § 1630.2(o)(3).
259. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 771 (3d Cir.
2004) (stating that the interactive process is required, in part, to "ascertain whether there is in
fact a disability"); Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (arguing that
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language of the regulations by stating that it is "merely a recognition that in
some circumstances the employer and employee can easily identify an
appropriate reasonable accommodation. ' 26 The EEOC's interpretive guidance,
which states that the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the
proper accommodation, also supports the assertion that it is a mandatory
261process. In addition, the agency's enforcement guidelines indicate:
[A]n employer should initiate the reasonable accommodation interactive
process without being asked if the employer: (1) knows that the employee
has a disability, (2) knows, or has reason to know, that the employee is
experiencing workplace problems because of the disability, and (3) knows,
or has reason to know, that the disabilit prevents the employee from
requesting a reasonable accommodation.
z2 6
Although courts have held that the interactive process is a requirement, no court
has found independent liability for failing to engage in the process.263 A
plaintiff that is not qualified under the ADA cannot impose liability on the
employer for its failure to comply with the interactive process requirement. 264
In real terms, then, the interactive process requirement has relevance only in
certain situations.265 Some courts have refused to grant summary judgment for
employers when they have not engaged in the interactive process.266
Another way in which the interactive process requirement is enforced
comes from the good-faith standard used in assessing compensatory and
punitive damages.267 Under the ADA, a plaintiff could be entitled to
compensatory and punitive damages if the employer engaged in intentional
discrimination. However, such damages may not be awarded when the
the interactive process is a requirement), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
260. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112.
261. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (2004) (cited in Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112).
262. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrrY COMM'N, supra note 187, at 5467-26 to 5467-27
(emphasis added).
263. See Autry, supra note 255, at 690 (arguing that the key to liability is the defendant's
failure to implement an available accommodation, not a failure to engage in the interactive
process).
264. See id at 687 (stating that courts have rejected the argument that liability can be found
for failure to engage in the interactive process when the employee is not qualified).
265. See id. at 691 (stating that the interactive process still has relevance in the context of a
motion for summary judgment and a request for punitive and compensatory damages).
266. See id at 692-93 (stating that some courts have held that a failure to interact in good
faith operates as a per se bar to an employer's obtaining summary judgment).
267. See id. at 694-96 (arguing that the interactive process limits compensatory and
punitive damages for employers).
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employer "demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with
the disability who has informed the [employer] that accommodation is needed,
to identify and make a reasonable accommodation. ' 26' The interactive process,
then, provides a sort of insurance against such damages by showing a good
faith effort to accommodate an employee who requests such accommodation.
269
In applying this to regarded-as disability cases, courts can discourage the
intentional or unintentional maintenance of incorrect perceptions by placing a
greater emphasis on the interactive process. Regardless of whether an
employee is attempting to actively game the reasonable accommodations
requirement or is simply not encouraged to correct an employer's
misperceptions, the interactive process would filter out these situations.
Court enforcement of the process would facilitate its institutionalization in
places of employment. Although courts may not wish to find liability solely
on a failure to engage in the interactive process, there is ample precedent for
enforcement at the summary judgment stage as well as the damages stage.27 °
From a policy perspective, the interactive process requirement facilitates
the purposes of the ADA by encouraging nonlegal remedies to inequality.271
The value of extrajudicial resolution has been recognized in other legal
doctrines such as the common-law and statutory rules of evidence.272
Similarly, the interactive process encourages a kind of mediation between the
employer and employee.273 As the Third Circuit has noted, standard
mediation practices are less costly, more confidential, and less invasive than
litigation, and the interactive process achieves these goals even more
effectively.274 Congress acknowledged this when it wrote that "[a] person
with a disability will know exactly what accommodation he or she will need
to perform successfully in a particular job,, 275 and that "frequently ... the
268. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2000) (quoted in Autry, supra note 255, at 694).
269. See Autry, supra note 255, at 696 (arguing that the interactive process immunizes an
employer from § 1981 damages).
270. See id. at 691 (stating that the interactive process still has continued relevance in the
context of a motion for summary judgment and a request for punitive and compensatory
damages).
271. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 316 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999)
(discussing the value of the interactive process as a form of mediation).
272. See, e.g., FED. R. EvlD. 408 (barring the admission of settlement offers into evidence
at trial); Winchester Packaging v. Mobil Chem. Co., 14 F.3d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating
that out-of-court resolution of legal disputes would be discouraged if settlement offers were
admissible as evidence).
273. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 315 n.6 (discussing the value of the interactive process as a
form of mediation).
274. Id.
275. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 66(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,348.
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employee['s] ... suggested accommodation is simpler and less expensive
than the accommodation the employer might have devised, resulting in the
employer and the employee mutually benefiting from the consultation.
' 276
The interactive process is particularly important as an extrajudicial tool when
no reasonable accommodation is actually required. As Congress stated in the
ADA's legislative history, "[m]any individuals with disabilities do not
require any reasonable accommodation whatsoever. The only change that
needs to be made ... is a change in [the employer's] attitude.,
277
In addition, emphasizing the interactive process requirement would
create consistent, predictable rules for courts and employers. For courts, the
benefit would be a simple, efficient means to test cases dealing with
reasonable accommodations for regarded as disabled employees at the early
stages of litigation. For employers, engaging in the interactive process would
have three benefits. First, it is likely that a misperception would be
eradicated by such a process, thus reducing the occurrences of discrimination
by misperception as well as the problems associated with being liable for not
reasonably accommodating a perceived disability. Second, even if the
misperception persists, they would be shielded from compensatory and
punitive damages and would have a better chance of succeeding early in
litigation. Third, the interactive process would likely ferret out intentional
misrepresentation by the employee. The court in Deane v. Pocono Medical
Center summarized these benefits best in noting,
[T]his protracted (and very much ongoing) litigation would likely have
been unnecessary had the parties taken seriously the ... importance of
communication and cooperation between employers and employees in
seeking reasonable accommodations. Specifically, we [have] noted that,
in the context of the Rehabilitation Act, "both parties have a duty to
assist in the search for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act
in good faith." ... While it may turn out that reasonable accommodation
for Deane is impossible. . . , nevertheless, an employer who fails to
engage in the interactive process runs a serious risk that it will
erroneously overlook an opportunity to accommodate a statutorily
disabled employee, and thereby violate the ADA.278
276. Id.
277. Id. at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349.
278. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citations
omitted).
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B. The Third Circuit's Limited Defense
As Judge Stapleton discusses in a footnote in Williams, there is generally
no good-faith defense for employers who mistakenly misperceive a plaintiff's
condition and subsequently fail to accommodate the plaintiff's actual
impairments. 279  However, if an employer engages in an "individualized
determination of the employee's actual condition" and develops a
misperception "based on the employee's unreasonable actions or omissions,"
the employer is entitled to a limited defense in the Third Circuit.2 80 The Circuit
has thus created a boundary for an employer's liability for accommodations.28'
This defense does not come from explicit language in the ADA or the EEOC
regulations but rather derives from the "general logic of the ADA., 282 In
formulating the defense, the court in Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc. cited a
line of Supreme Court cases that created an affirmative defense for Title VII
liability based on concerns for logic and equity.
283
According to Pathmark, the ADA has as a major purpose the protection of
individuals who are subject to stereotypes about their abilities.28 In a situation
in which an employee (or his agent) is responsible for a factual mistake about
the extent of the employee's impairment, prejudice is not involved.28 5 In this
situation, said the Pathmark court, a limited defense best serves the aims of the
ADA.286 The court was careful, however, to distinguish this situation from an
innocent mistake where the employer failed to engage in an "individualized
determination," or an interactive process.287 Put simply, "There is no defense of
279. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 770 n.14 (3d Cir.
2004) (discussing limited good faith defenses available to employers who failed to reasonably
accommodate a perceived disability).
280. Williams, 380 F.3d at 770 n. 14 (citing Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180,
193 (3d Cir. 1999)).
281. Pathmark, 177 F.3d at 192.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 192 n.6 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)).
284. Id. at 192; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(1) (2000) (stating that a purpose ofthe ADA
is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities").
285. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1999) (asserting
that a factual mistake by an employer that is attributable to the employee or his agent should not
create liability under the ADA).
286. Id.
287. See id. at 193 ("We emphasize that it is not reasonable for an employer to extrapolate
from information provided by an employee based on stereotypes or fears about the disabled.").
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reasonable mistake. '2 88 The court presented the defense as an extension of the
interactive process requirement. It stated that the rule "is consistent with [the]
decision in Deane, in which [the court] emphasized the employer's failure to
take reasonable steps to learn the true extent of the plaintiff's impairment.
2 89
Currently, only courts in the Third Circuit utilize the defense articulated in
Pathmark.290 As that court suggested, however, the defense is fully compatible
with the logic of the ADA as well as the interactive process requirement that
courts have imposed. Adopting such a limited defense would serve to balance
the Williams-like requirements for regarded-as individuals and the interactive
process. Employers who engaged in the interactive process with an employee
in apparent need of a reasonable accommodation would have the security of an
available defense should an employee fail to similarly engage in the process in
good faith. Additionally, the defense could quell judicial concerns about the
possibility of such employee practices.
VI. Conclusion
When confronted with two conflicting statutory provisions, the Oregon
Supreme Court once conjured the military adage that "all battles are fought at
the comer of two maps. 291 Like the proverbial military battles that the Oregon
court alluded to, Williams and other cases like it fall obstinately within the
intersection of two ADA provisions-the "reasonable accommodation"
provision and the "regarded as" provision. Although several indicators have
been given as to how these two sections fit together, the intersection has never
been explicitly charted. Until Congress or the Supreme Court addresses the
issue directly, courts will be left with only theoretical results and actual effects
to guide their interpretation of the Act.
In the larger sense, it is the tension between theory and reality that may
have the most effect on past, and future, court decisions on the issue. Some
courts have looked to the abstract theoretical results of the plain language of the
ADA and, seeing possible absurdity, have refused to abide it. Other courts
have given more weight to the facts before it, and finding that the plain
288. Id.
289. Id. at 194.
290. See, e.g., Volitis v. Merck & Co., 129 F. Supp. 2d 765, 772-73 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(granting summary judgment for the employer when the plaintiff-employee acted unreasonably
in failing to correct the employer's misperception).
291. Schultz v. Bank of the West, 934 P.2d 421,423 (Ore. 1997) (referring to two sections
of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code that required interpretation and reconciliation).
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language would provide a proper actual result, have ruled as such. Ultimately,
the question may be not which approach is right or wrong but which approach
is relevant given the goals of the Act. This Note proposes that both approaches
are relevant to some extent and can be reconciled through a greater emphasis on
the interactive process and Third Circuit defense.
This Note concludes that employers should be liable for failing to provide
reasonable accommodations for those regarded as disabled. It also concludes
that employers should be required to engage in the interactive process when
faced with an employee who may need accommodation. However, if the
employer engages in the interactive process and the employee acts
unreasonably by failing to correct any misperceptions, the employer should be
relieved of any duty to accommodate the misconception. True to the expressed
vision of the Americans with Disabilities Act, this approach creates "clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination, 292 against
individuals with real or perceived disabilities.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000).
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